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and Executive Committee, IATA 1945; official observer, Assembly,
PICAO, 1946, and Assembly, ICAO, 1947. Author of "The Right
to Fly."
T WO comparatively recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States require an immediate and urgent reconsideration
of the respective sovereign rights of the State Governments and the
Federal Government in the airspace over the United States.
By its decision in United States v. Causby,l construing the Air Com-
merce Act of 1926 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the Court
has divided the airspace over the United States into two zones. In the
lower zone next to the earth's surface, private property in the airspace
is permitted and we must assume that in that zone normal relation-
ships exist between State and Federal sovereignty as elsewhere in State
territory. But in the upper zone (the navigable airspace) the rights of
the Federal Government seem to have been considered so paramount
that Congress was able to place the navigable airspace, as stated in the
Court's opinion, "within the public domain." The opinion does not
indicate what rights, if any, the subjacent State has in that part of the
navigable airspace public domain lying over its surface territory.
By its later decision in United States v. State of California,2 the
Court found that the State of California is not the owner of the three-
mile marginal ocean belt along its coasts or the lands underlying that
belt. The opinion in that case indicates that the Court felt that para-
mount rights in and power over this ocean belt had been acquired
directly by the Federal Government since the adoption of the United
States Constitution. It must be noted that the Causby case is there
cited, apparently to sustain the need for the Federal Government hav-
ing a paramount position as against State sovereignty when national
rights are involved.
If these two cases are read together, surprising conclusions result.
Either the several States may be held under these rulings to be entirely
without sovereignty or right of control in the navigable airspace over
1328 U.S. 256 (1946).
2 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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their surface territories, or the power and rights of the Federal Gov-
ernment may be found so paramount in the navigable airspace as to
produce the same legal results.
If the Federal Government alone has sovereign rights in the navi-
gable airspace, and if such airspace is not part of the territory of the
several subjacent States, then the statutes of such States do not govern
crimes committed or other wrongful acts occurring in the navigable
airspace, and the State courts are without jurisdiction to hear such
cases. In addition, the entire problem of the respective rights of the
Federal Government and the several States to regulate commerce in
the navigable airspace must be fully re-examined. Admittedly these
are serious questions - the answers'to which should not be delayed.
ARGUMENTS FAVORING EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY
These are not new questions. In 1926 they were raised carefully
and forcefully by Mr. Frederic P. Lee (then legislative counsel of the
United States Senate), in an article entitled "The Air Domain of the
United States."3 The same questions were later raised by Mr. Clement
L. Bouv6 in 1936.4 Lee thus stated the problem:
"If it is found that the airspace above the United States is part
of the domain of the United States as against all foreign nations,
there then remains the further question as to whether that portion
of such airspace above the lands and waters of any one of the
United States is a part of the domain of that State. Is the airspace
above Massachusetts a part of the domain of Massachusetts, or is
it exclusive Federal domain? From the conclusion that such air-
space is part of the State's domain, it would follow that the terri-
torial sovereignty of the State or the Federal Government, includ-
ing its legislative powers, extends to such airspace in the same
measure as it extends to the lands and waters of the State; that is,
along the ordinary lines of demarcation which the Constitution sets
forth as to State and Federal powers. For example, under the
commerce power the Federal Government will be able to regulate
broadcasting and commercial radio communication or air naviga-
tion only if such regulation constitutes 'the regulation of com-
merce with foreign nations and among the several States.'
"On the other hand, if it is found that the airspace above the
lands and waters of any State is not a part of the domain of that
State,. but only of the Federal Government, then the Federal
Government will have, to the exclusion of the States, sole legisla-
tive powers as to radio communication and air navigation in such
airspace. The various Territories and possessions, the District of
Columbia, and the Canal Zone, together with places purchased with
the consent of State legislatures for the erection of forts, maga-
zines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful public buildings, af-
ford examples of land domain over which the Federal Government
has exclusive territorial sovereignty as against the States." 5
3 CIVIL AERONAUTICS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT OF
1926, CORRECTED TO AUGUST 1, 1928, U.S. Gov't Printing Office (1943).
4 Bouv6, State Sovereignty or International Sovereignty Over Navigable
Airspace? 3 J.D.C. Bar Ass'n 5 (1936).
5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 105.
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No one any longer questions the fact that the United States as a
single nation exercises complete and exclusive sovereignty in the air-
space over the lands and waters of the United States to the exclusion
of all foreign governments. This exclusive national sovereignty has
been asserted by the United States in the Air Commerce Act of 1926.
the Havana Convention of 1928, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
and the Chicago Convention of 1944.
But the fact that we have accepted the doctrine -of exclusive na-
tional sovereignty as against foreign governments does not necessarily
mean that the several States are without sovereign rights in the air-
space over their territories so far as the exercise of internal regulatory
and police powers is concerned. For, as pointed out by Lee in the
memorandum quoted above, if the airspace is not part of the exclusive
domain of the Federal Government, such airspace must be considered
as part of the domain of the several States in which the-Federal Gov-
ernment exercises only those sovereign rights which it holds under the
Constitution and as a single nation in the family of nations. This
would put the airspace over a State in the same legal and constitutional
status as the lands and waters of that State.
Lee concluded, however, in the article cited above, that the navi-
gable airspace is the exclusive territory of the'Federal Government,
which thus, according to him, has exclusive sovereignty (both external
and internal) except as to an airspace strata close to the surface. This
strata may be considered, he said, as that part of the airspace which
since earliest times has been used by mankind in the construction of
buildings and other such similar uses as are required by human dwell-
ers on the earth's surface. As to this "surface strata" he concluded that
it was part of the territory of the several States, subject to the same
Constitutional control by the Federal government as exists over the
lands and waters of State territory. But all other airspace he consid-
ered as Federal territory. He reached this conclusion in the following
way.
No nation, so he said, acquired any domain in what we now know
as navigable airspace until such domain was needed to protect sub-
jacent national territory. "It is necessary," said Lee, "that the domain
over the airspace above the lands and waters of the United States be
held by the United States so that it may lawfully exercise its sovereignty
throughout its airspace in order adequately to protect the occupants
of the lands and interior from attack; and regulate air commerce and
radio communication to and from land and water ports." But as
neither air navigation nor radio communication made substantial and
continual use of the airspace until the present century, Lee insisted
that no nation anywhere in the world had either by occupation or by
need of protection acquired any domain in the upper airspace prior
thereto. Accordingly, in his view, the United States did not acquire
sovereignty in the upper airspace until long after the adoption of the
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Federal Constitution. From this it would follow that the original
colonies had no domain in the upper airspace and it was not part of
their territory when the Constitution was adopted. After the adoption
of the Constitution, no State could acquire territory in the airspace as
this would amount, in his judgment, to the acquirement of new or
additional domain, a function vested solely in the Federal Govern-
ment. Airspace domain, therefore, according to Lee, was acquired
by the United States, long after the adoption of the Constitution, as
exclusive Federal territory and as an addition to the previously exist-
ing national public domain. The airspace thus acquired came under
the exclusive sovereignty of the Federal Government as would other
new territory thus acquired.
"If the conclusion is correct that the Federal government has ex-
clusive sovereignty in the airspace above the surface of the several
States," continued Lee, "it would seem to be beyond the power of the
State to legislate as to the activities in the upper strata of airspace.
So to legislate would be analogous to an attempt by the State to legis-
late as to activities in the District of Columbia, in the Territory of
Hawaii or Alaska, in the possessions of the United States, or in any
other area, such as forts, arsenals, magazines, and dockyards, over which
the Federal government has exclusive sovereignty."
Mr. Bouv6 reached similar conclusions. Writing in 19306 he had
insisted that the airspace was, in international law, new territory added,
as the result of the capacity of man to fly, to the territory previously
subject to national sovereignty. Later, Bouv6 asserted that "national
sovereignty over navigable airspace could not exist in fact until the
discovery of the art of human flight over a century following the adop-
tion of the Constitution, during which the capacity to control - a sine
qua non of national sovereignty - was lacking."' 7 Accordingly, Bouv6
concluded, as had Lee, that "national sovereignty" in the navigable
airspace included sovereignty for all purposes external or internal.
He summarizes his conclusions as follows:
"What are the facts of the case of State Sovereignty vs. Federal
Sovereignty of Navigable Airspace? First: An attempt on the
part of a political subdivision of a national power to extend its
territorial domain into an expanse which constitutes a natural
channel of international aerial navigation as truly as the high seas
constitute a national channel of international water navigation.
The considerations which led to the adoption of the doctrine of
national air sovereignty with respect to these regions in no way
applies to political subdivisions of national States. Second: An
attempt on the pat of a political subdivision of a national power
to project its jurisdiction into regions no portion of which is
physically susceptible of occupancy by its citizens in their private
capacity or by any instrumentality of the subjacent State, and
hence physically insusceptible of private or public ownership.
Third: An attempt on the part of a State of the Union to establish
8 Bouv6, The Development of International Rules of Conduct in Air Naviga.-
tion, 1 Air L. Rev. 1 (1930).
7Bouv6, supra note 4 at 11.
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sovereignty over a region consisting entirely of a navigable me-
dium which, by nature, like the sea, can serve one purpose only -
that of navigation; a region, sovereignty over which has been es-
tablished by the law of nations for one purpose only, to-wit,
national control in-the interests of the subjacent nation. Such
control cannot be exercised by a State of the Union under the Con-
stitution. Sovereignty involves the opportunity to exercise polit-
ical power, and its exercise is the expression of that power; and
where, as here, the only form in which that power is capable of
being exerted is by the domestic as well as international law en-
trusted to the National Government the conception of its exercise
by a political subdivision of the National State presents an anomaly
from- the standpoint of both legal systems. Fourth: An attempt
on the part of a State of the Union to acquire territory beyond its
borders - an attempt to exercise a power prohibited to the'States
under the Constitution. Fifth: An attempt to create a situation
which, until the fallacy of the premise on which it rests is demon-
strated and the demonstration accepted will constitute a barrier
to the establishment of uniform rules of aerial traffic. These rules
come within the exclusive field of Congressional authorization not
only by virtue of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, but
because of the national character of the territory which constitutes
the navigable airspace of the United States."
OPINIONS OF STATE COURTS BASED ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The views put forth by Lee and Bouv6 do not express, very natu-
rally, the authoritative opinion of State courts and legislatures. In the
best analysis of the State's Rights position, Chief Justice Rugg of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, has said:
"It is essential to the safety of sovereign States that they possess
jurisdiction to control the airspace above their territories. It seems
to us to rest on the obvious practical necessity of self-protection.
Every government completely sovereign in character must possess
power to prevent from entering its confines those whom it deter-
mines to be undesirable. That power extends to the exclusion from
the air of all hostile persons or demonstrations, and to the regu-
lation of passage through the air of all persons in the interests
of the public welfare and the safety of those on the face of the
earth. This jurisdiction was vested in this Commonwealth when
it became a sovereign State on its separation from Great Britain.
So far as concerns interstate commerce, postal service and some
other matters, jurisdiction over passage through the air in large
part was surrendered to the United States by the adoption of the
Federal Constitution. Constitution of the United States, Art. 1,§8."9
This language was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in 1944, Erickson v. King, State Auditor, et al.10 In these
and other cases affecting internal sovereignty over the airspace, it
has been assumed that the airspace over a State is part of the ter-
ritory of the State and that Federal sovereignty flows from the
8 Id. at 28.
9 Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 521, 170 N.E. 385, 389,
1930 USAvR 1, 9 (1930).
10218 Minn. 98, 15 N.W. (2d) 201 (1944).
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Constitution and can be exercised only to the extent needed to pro-
tect and assist Federal jurisdiction over interstate and foreign com-
merce. To sustain this point of view, it is interesting to note that
Chief Justice Rugg felt it necessary to hold that sovereignty in the
airspace had existed in the Government of Great Britain prior to
the Revolution and had passed to the several colonies, and thence
to the Federal Government "so far as concerns interstate commerce,
postal service and some other matters." Both Lee and Bouv6 con-
tended that sovereignty in the airspace was not accepted in inter-
national law until the early part of the present century and after
man had attained sufficient capacity .to fly to indicate a practical ability
to use and control the airspace.
In many of the States, as in North Carolina, whose statute is quoted
and discussed in the Causby case, very definite statutory claim to State
airspace sovereignty over navigable airspace has been put forward.
In over twenty States there is still in effect the so-called "Uniform
State Law of Aeronautics" which contains provisions to the effect
that "sovereignty in the space above the land and waters of this
State is declared to rest in the State, except where granted to and
assumed by the United States pursuant to a Constitutional grant
from the people of this State" - that "the ownership of the space above
the land and waters of this State is declared to be vested in the
several owners of the surface beneath," subject to a right of flight-
that crimes, torts, or wrongs committed and all contractual and other
legal relations entered into by persons "while in flight over this State"
shall be governed by the laws of, or have the same effect as if entered
into on the land or water of the subjacent State.
It must be admitted, however, that these or other similar State
laws will be invalid in so much of the navigable airspace as may be
found not to-be within the territory of the several States. It must
also beadmitted that the declaration of a State that it has sovereignty
in the airspace can be based on only one or the other of two theories:
either, first, that the several original American colonies became vested
with sovereignty over and title to the airspace as part of their original
territory and had such territory at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States' even though the art of flight did
not then exist; or, second, that the States have acquired the airspace
as additional territory since the adoption of the Constitution and
the development of the art of flight.
Both Lee and Bouv6 argue with great force, and it seems to me
almost conclusively, that no State has a right to acquire new territory
or to extend its boundaries, and that the acquisition of new terri-
tory is a function solely of the Federal Government. This would
appear to leave the problem dependent on the historic status of
airspace sovereignty - when did the nations of the world acquire such
sovereignty? In other words, has the airspace always been within the
sovereign control of the nations of the-world, or, as Bouv6 contended,
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is the airspace new territory that was acquired by the several sovereign
nations after man demonstrated his capacity to fly?
AIR COMMERCE ACT AND CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT
In the adoption of the Air. Commerce Act of 1926, Congress did
not attempt to- fix the extent of State sovereignty in the airspace. The
report of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of
the House of Representatives, contained in Legislative History of
the Air Commerce Act of 1926,11 includes certain interesting com-
ments. Section 4 of the Act authorized airspace reservations to be
established by Executive Order of the President. It also authorized
the several States to establish necessary airspace reservations, pro-
vided that they were "not in conflict either with airspace reservations
established by the President under this Section or with any civil or
military airway designated under provisions of the Act." Commenting
on this Section, the House Committee said:
"Airspace reservations must necessarily be established in order
that domestic and foreign aircraft may not be able to fly over
forts and certain other governmental structures, and in order to
protect aircraft from dangers of flying over Weather Bureau
stations where pilot balloons are used, or over experimental or
training fields of the military or naval forces. The power of the
President to establish Federal Government airspace reservations
in the States in nowise diminishes the power of the States to
establish airspace reservations for such other purposes as they
deem advisable so long as such reservations are within the air-
space over which the States have acquired or retained sovereignty
under the Constitution and so long as the establishment of the
reservation is an exercise of a constitutional power reserved to
the States and does not interfere with the Federal airspace reser-
vations or with the Federal airways." (Italics supplied.) 12
In Section 6 of the Act, Congress declared that the Government
of the United States "has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations,
complete sovereignty of the airspace over the lands and waters of
the United States . .. "',3 Commenting on this Section, the House
Committee said:
"Article 1 of the International Air Navigation Convention pro-
vides that 'the high contracting parties recognize that every
power has complete and exclusive sovereignty of the airspace
above its territory.' In this Section the Congress declares that the
United States adheres to the same principle and not to the prin-
ciple urged by some international jurists that there is a free right
of flight in the airspace above a nation regardless of the consent
or the restrictions by law of that nation.
"The Section in nowise affects the apportionment of sovereignty
as between the several States and the United States, but only as
between the United States and the rest of the world. Insofar as
the States had sovereignty in the airspace at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution and such sovereignty was not by that
instrument delegated to the Federal Government, and insofar as
11 Note 3 supra.
12 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, op. cit. supra note 3,'at 36.
13 AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926 §6, 44 Stat. 572, 49 USCA §176 (Supp. 1947).
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the States may have subsequently acquired sovereignty in airspace
in accordance with the Constitution, such sovereignty remains
unchanged." (Italics supplied.) 14
In Section 10 of the Act, 15 the term "navigable airspace" was
defined to mean airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight
as prescribed in the Act. The Section also provided that "such navi-
gable airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of inter
state and foreign air navigation in conformity with the requirements
of this Act.''16 In discussing this definition of navigable airspace, the
Committee pointed out that it was the intent of the applicable section
" . . . to assert a public right of freedom of navigation by aircraft in
the airspace above described within the safe altitudes of flight, which
is superior to the right of the owner of the subjacent land to use
such airspace for conflicting purpose," and that "this public right of
freedom of navigation is analogous to the easement of public right
of navigation over the navigable waters of the United States."'17 The
Committee also said that it was of the opinion " . . . that the Federal
Government may assert under the commerce clause and other consti-
tutional powers a public right of navigation in the navigable airspace,
regardless of the ownership of the land below and regardless of any
question as to the ownership of the air or airspace itself." (Italics
supplied.) 18
It will be noted from the foregoing comments that the House
Committee did not state what, if any, airspace sovereignty was held
by the States at the time of the adoption of the, Constitution, nor
whether the States had actually acquired such sovereignty since that
time, nor did it base the validity of the Air Commerce Act solely on
the commerce clause of the Constitution. The most that can be said
is that the Air Commerce Act was not apparently intended by Con-
gress to take from the States such airspace sovereignty, if any, which
they then had.
In the light of the decision in the Causby case, certain changes
in the statutes made by the adoption of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 are perhaps of importance.
Section 1 of the Civil Aeronautics Act broadened the term "air
commerce" to include (in addition to interstate, overseas, or foreign
air commerce) the transportation of mail by aircraft, operation or
navigation of aircraft within the limits of any civil airway, or "any
operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or which may
endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce."' 19
14 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 38.
15 Id. §10, 44 Stat. 574, 49 USCA §181 (Supp. 1947).
16 Ibid.
17 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 42.
18 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 45.
19 CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT OP 1938 §1, 52 Stat. 977, 49 USCA §401 (3) (Supp.
1947).
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The declaration of national sovereignty was changed by amending
Section 6 of the Air Commerce Act and striking out reference to
"foreign nations;, so as to read as follows:
"The United States of America is hereby declared to possess and
exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air-
space above the United States, including the airspace above all
inland waters and the airspace above those portions of the ad-
jacent marginal high seas, bays, and lakes, over which by inter-
national law or treaty or convention the United States exercises
national jurisdiction. '20
By Section 3 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, the public right of
transit was restated to read as follows:
"There is hereby recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any
citizen of the United States a public right of freedom of transit
in air commerce through the navigable airspace of the United
States."21
DIscussION OF RECENT U. S. SUPREME COURT CASES
In 1936, prior to the adoption of the Civil Aeronautics Act, the
Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice
Sutherland, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., et al.,22
said:
"As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies
acting as a unit the powers of external sovereignty passed from
the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their
collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America.
. . . It results that the investment of the Federal Government
with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend on the
affirmative grants of the Constitution. . . .The power to acquire
territory by discovery and occupation, the power to expel unde-
sirable aliens, the power to make such international agreements
as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense, none of
which is expressly affirmed by the Constitution, nevertheless exist
as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality." 23
This opinion has affected many subsequent opinions of the Court
where national sovereignty is involved.
Such was the situation when the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1946 handed down its decision in the Causby case. In the
first sentence of the majority opinion the case is stated to be "one
of first impression." In discussing the Air Commerce Act and the
Civil Aeronautics Act, the Court noted that under those statutes the
United States has "complete and exclusive national sovereignty in
the airspace" over this country; that these Acts grant any citizen
of the United States "a public right of freedom of transit in air
commerce through the navigable airspace of the United States"; that
"the navigable airspace" is defined as "airspace above the minimum
safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority."
20 Note 13 supra.
21 CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT OF 1938 §3, 52 Stat. 980, 49 USCA §403 (Supp.
1947).
22299 U.S. 304 (1936).
23Id. at 316.
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In deciding the case, the Court refused to accept the ancient doctrine
that at common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery
of the universe - stating that this "doctrine has no place in the modern
world"- that "the air is a public highway, as Congress has declared."
(Italics supplied.) Continuing its opinion and discussing- the low
flights which were charged by the landowner as resulting in the
"taking" of his property, the Court found that "the flights in question
were not within the navigable airspace which Congress placed withili
the public domain." (Italics supplied.)
Continuing the opinion and stating again that the airspace is a
public highway, the Court found nevertheless that if the landowner
is to have full enjoyment of the land he must have exclusive control
of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere; that there-
fore "the landowner owns at least as much of the space above the
ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land." The
Court further noted that, under the statute of the State of North
Carolina in which the land was situated, sovereignty of the airspace
rests in the State "except where granted to and assumed by the
United States," and that, subject to a right of flight held lawful unless
at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to
which the land is put, "ownership of the space above the lands and
waters of this State is declared to be vested in the several owners of
the surface beneath." The Court then stated:
"Our holding that there was an invasion of respondents' property
is thus not inconsistent with the local law governing a landowner's
claim to the immediate reaches of the superjacent airspace."
(Italics supplied.) 24
The opinion does not disclose what rights, if any, the State
retained in the navigable airspace in which the right of private
property contemplated by the State statute was held in substance to
be contrary to the action of Congress in declaring the upper strata or
navigable airspace to be a public highway and part of the public
domain. Nor does the opinion indicate how or when the State of
North Carolina had granted to the United States such complete
sovereignty in the upper strata of the airspace that the Congress was
empowered to take the action just noted, or whether the Court's find-
ing is based on the theory (as outlined by Lee in the article discussed
above) that State sovereignty exists only in the'lower airspace strata
near the earth's surface in which private property can also exist.
Considering the references in the opinion, to the claim of the
United States that it has complete and exclusive national sovereignty
in the airspace, and in the absence of any finding that national sover-
eignty in the navigable airspace arises solely from the commerce clause
of the Constitution and is limited by that clause, we are almost forced
to the assumption that the Court was actually of the opinion that no
State sovereignty exists in the navigable airspace, or that the Federal
24 Supra note 1, at 266.
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Government has such paramount power therein as to make State
sovereignty of no practical importance.
This conclusion is supported by the decision and opinion of the
Court in United States v. State of California. In that case, as has
been stated earlier, the Court denied the right of the State of Califor-
nia to the oil and other resources under the three-mile marginal ocean
belt. The opinion includes the following findings: that the thirteen
original colonies did not acquire from the Crown of England title to
the three-mile marginal ocean belt nor the land underlying it; that
after the United States became a nation our statesmen became inter-
ested in establishing national dominion over a definite marginal zone
to protect our neutrality; that protection and control of this marginal
belt is a function of national external sovereignty; that the State of
California was not the owner of the marginal belt along its coast;
that the Federal Government rather than the State, has paramount
rights in and power over that belt.
No one reading this opinion can fail to note the striking similarity
between the line of reasoning adopted by the Court and the position
taken by both Lee and Bouv6-in asserting that sovereignty in the
navigable airspace never was vested in the original colonies nor in
the States, but that it was acquired long after the adoption of the
Constitution by the Federal Government as exclusive Federal terri-
tory needed for national purposes The importance of the Causby
case in this line of reasoning, and the force of the decision in the
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., et al., is evidenced by
the fact that the California case opinion cites both of these cases as
authority in the finding that "national rights are paramount in waters
lying to the seaward in the three-mile belt."
CONCLUSIONS
My own personal view has never been in accord with that expressed
by Lee and Bouv6. I have always felt that the airspace over a nation
was an integral part of the nation's territory. I have never been
impressed with the argument that such airspace did not become part
of national, territory until nations had the physical ability to fly in
that territory and thus to control and occupy it. It has always seemed
to me that the airspace in the early days was in, exactly the same
status as those mountain peaks which mankind could not scale or
the dense jungles which he could not penetrate. The lack of physical
ability to reach and control such parts of a nation's territory can
hardly be urged as a reason for denying that such mountains and
jungles are under the sovereign domain of a nation if found within
its recognized boundaries. The obvious need of a nation. to control
its own airspace existed from the earliest days when mankind first
envisaged the possibility of flight.
Strong legal arguments have, however, been put forward to sus-
tain the view that the airspace did not become part of the territory of
any nation until after the art of flight was fully developed in the early
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twentieth century. We cannot overlook the very obvious fact that
the opinions of the Supreme Court in the Causby case and in the
California case show a definite trend, if not a final decision, challeng-
ing the validity of State sovereignty in the navigable airspace. This
trend seems to be based both on the argument that the States did not
have sovereignty in the airspace at the time of adoption of the Con-
stitution and could not acquire such sovereignty thereafter, and also
on the argument that complete and exclusive national control of the
navigable airspace is necessary to the nation as a single member of the
family of nations.
It is obvious that this matter deserves the serious and early con-
sideration of the Congress of the United States. If there be any doubt
as to the existence of State sovereignty in the navigable airspace, Fed-
eral legislation should be passed without delay so that State statutes
applicable in the territory of a subjacent State would also be applica-
ble in the navigable airspace over that State, except when in direct
conflict with other Federal legislation. Perhaps additional legislation
should be adopted ceding to each State all Federal territorial claim
to the airspace over such State, but reserving to the Federal Govern-
ment exclusive national sovereignty as against foreign nations. This
would eliminate possible sovereignty differences in the upper and
lower airspace strata, would include the entire airspace over a state
within the territory of that State for local administration, and would
leave the constitutional sovereignty relations of State and Federal
Governments in the same status throughout the territory within the
boundaries of any State, whether on the surface or in the airspace.
